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Immigration, Offshoring, and American Jobs†
By Gianmarco I. P. Ottaviano, Giovanni Peri, and Greg C. Wright*
The relocation of jobs abroad by multinationals and the increased labor market 
competition due to immigrant workers are often credited with the demise of many 
manufacturing jobs once held by American citizens. While it is certainly true that 
manufacturing production and employment, as a percentage of the total economy, 
have declined over recent decades in the United States, measuring the impact of 
those two aspects of globalization on jobs has been difficult. This is due to the pos-
sible presence of two opposing effects. On the one hand, there is a direct “displace-
ment effect”: offshoring some production processes or hiring immigrants to perform 
them directly reduces the demand for native workers. On the other hand, there is an 
indirect “productivity effect”: the cost savings associated with employing immigrant 
and offshore labor increases the efficiency of the production process, thus raising the 
demand for native workers—if not in the same tasks that are offshored or given to 
immigrant workers, then certainly in tasks that are complementary to them.
Several recent papers have emphasized the potential productivity effect of off-
shoring, arguing that this effect could offset or even reverse the displacement effect 
and thereby generate an overall non-negative effect on the wage or employment 
of native workers (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 2008; Costinot and Vogel 2010; 
Harrison and McMillan 2011; Wright 2012). These papers focus on the patterns of 
substitutability between native and offshore workers. Other papers have suggested 
that immigrants may generate an analogous productivity effect by increasing the 
demand for native workers, especially in production tasks that are complementary 
to those performed by immigrants (Ottaviano and Peri 2012; Peri 2012; Peri and 
Sparber 2009). These papers look at the patterns of substitutability between native 
and immigrant workers. Little attention has been paid so far to the simultaneous pat-
terns of substitutability between native, immigrant and offshore workers.
In this paper we argue that the joint investigation of the interactions among these 
three groups of workers is useful in order to improve our understanding of the 
impact of globalization on the US labor market and, in particular, to answer two 
hotly debated questions. First, how do declines in offshoring and immigration costs 
affect the employment of native workers? Second, what kinds of jobs suffer, or 
benefit, the most from the competition created by offshore and immigrant workers?
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At the core of our argument are two observations: first, that jobs (“tasks”) vary in 
terms of the relative intensity of use of complex tasks and, second, that native, immi-
grant and offshore groups differ in their efficiency in performing complex tasks. 
Throughout the paper we consider the complexity of a task to be increasing in the 
intensity of use of communication and cognitive skills and decreasing in the manual 
content of the task. Communication skills may be important because the execution 
of complex tasks often requires a sophisticated dialogue between workers whereas, 
in contrast, manual tasks are much easier to describe and carry out in the absence of 
these skills. It is therefore natural to think that the cost of performing tasks in other 
countries (offshoring) or assigning these tasks to people with limited knowledge of 
the local language and culture (immigrants) increases with the complexity of the 
task. Efficiency gains can then be reaped by hiring these workers to perform tasks 
in which they have a comparative advantage, that is, in which they generate a lower 
cost per efficiency unit of labor,1 while also giving native workers the opportunity 
to specialize in the tasks in which they exhibit their own comparative advantage. If 
strong enough, the productivity effect associated with this efficient pattern of task 
specialization may offset the displacement effect of immigration and offshoring on 
native workers’ employment.
We develop this argument in three steps. First, we present some new facts on 
58 industries, which together comprise the US manufacturing sector, from 2000 to 
2007. We argue that these facts are consistent with a scenario in which: (i) there is 
stronger substitutability between immigrants and offshore workers than between 
immigrants and natives; (ii) immigrant, native and offshore workers are relatively 
specialized in tasks of different skill complexity; and, in particular, (iii) immigrants 
are relatively specialized in low complexity tasks, natives in high complexity tasks, 
and offshore workers in medium complexity tasks.2 Unfortunately, the complexity 
of the tasks performed by offshore workers is not directly observable.
In the second step we build on Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) to design 
a partial equilibrium model of task assignment among heterogeneous native, immi-
grant and offshore workers within an industry that is consistent with the observed 
facts. We then use the model to draw systematic predictions of the effects of falling 
barriers to immigration and offshoring on the tasks, the employment share, and the 
employment level of native workers. An important assumption of the model, con-
sistent with a series of facts that we present, is that offshore workers specialize in 
tasks of intermediate “complexity” between those of immigrants and natives. The 
model generates two main sets of predictions. First, borrowing the terminology of 
Costinot and Vogel (2010), a decline in immigration costs leads to “task upgrad-
ing” of immigrants as these workers are assigned some medium complexity tasks 
that were previously performed by offshore workers. Second, lower immigration 
costs have little impact on the task complexity of native workers, who are located at 
1 See Costinot and Vogel (2010) for the equivalence of the trade concept of “comparative advantage” and the 
matching concept of “log-supermodularity.”
2 The choice to focus on manufacturing and not include services reflects the research questions we have chosen 
to address. It is also forced on us by data availability as there is limited data on services offshoring. Moreover, the 
production function approach at the core of our analysis is much better understood in the context of manufactur-
ing than in the context of services. Lastly, the range of skills spanned by tasks is richer in manufacturing than in 
services, leaving more room for gains due to their reallocation.
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the high end of the task complexity spectrum. On the other hand, a decline in off-
shoring costs simultaneously leads to task upgrading of natives and task downgrad-
ing of immigrants: offshore workers are assigned the most complex among the low 
complexity tasks previously performed by immigrants, as well as the least complex 
among the high complexity tasks previously performed by natives. In this case, the 
result is increased task polarization between immigrants and natives in the domestic 
labor market.
The other set of predictions concerns the response of industry employment fol-
lowing the reallocation of tasks described above. Employment shares move as dic-
tated by the “displacement effect”: a group of workers from which tasks are taken 
away sees its employment share fall; a group of workers to which new tasks are 
assigned sees its employment share increase. If the “productivity effect” is weak, 
employment levels move in the same direction as employment shares. On the other 
hand, when the efficiency gains from immigration or offshoring are strong enough, 
employment levels may increase for all groups of workers and not only for those 
whose employment shares go up. Intuitively, the changes in employment shares are 
determined by movements along the relative labor demand curves of the different 
groups of workers, as dictated by changes in their relative efficiency. The changes in 
employment levels, however, are also affected by the outward shifts in labor demand 
produced by the increase in the overall efficiency of the production process.
In the end, whether the employment of natives rises or falls when immigration and 
offshoring become easier, and whether the observed change is consistent with our 
story, is an empirical issue. By using employment data on immigrants and natives 
from the American Community Survey (ACS) and on offshore workers by US mul-
tinational affiliates from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), we indeed find 
that easier offshoring reduces the employment shares of both native and immigrant 
workers while easier immigration reduces the employment share of offshore work-
ers only, with no impact on the employment share of natives. Nonetheless, when we 
look at employment levels (rather than shares), we find that easier offshoring does 
not have any significant effect whereas easier immigration has a positive and mildly 
significant impact on natives. This is consistent with the existence of positive pro-
ductivity effects due to immigration and offshoring.
By matching occupation data from the ACS with the manual, communication 
and cognitive skill content of tasks performed in each occupation (from the US 
Department of Labor’s O*NET abilities survey), we then assess the response of the 
“complexity” of those tasks to immigration and offshoring. Here we find that easier 
offshoring raises the average complexity of native tasks, increasing the gap between 
native and immigrant task complexity. In contrast, easier immigration has no effect 
on the average complexity of native tasks. Overall, our findings imply that immi-
grants do not compete directly with natives. We suggest that the reason for this is 
that immigrants and natives are concentrated at opposite ends of the task complexity 
spectrum. Offshore workers, instead, are specialized in tasks of intermediate com-
plexity (though we do not directly observe this) generating some competition with 
both immigrants and natives, as revealed by the effect on employment shares and on 
task intensities of those two groups.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the novel 
contributions of this paper in the context of the existing literature. Section II presents 
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the data, highlighting some key facts that inform the subsequent analysis. Section III 
presents a theoretical model consistent with those facts, deriving predictions to be 
brought under econometric scrutiny. Section IV produces the econometric evidence 
on the predictions of the theoretical model. Section V concludes.
I. Related Literature
Several recent papers have analyzed the effect of offshoring on the demand for 
domestic labor and are relevant to the present analysis. On the theoretical front, 
Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) provide a simple model of trade in production 
tasks. This model will serve as the framework for our analysis, though we will focus 
on employment rather than on wage effects.3 Recent and relevant empirical work 
includes Crinò (2010); Hummels et al. (2010); Harrison and McMillan (2011); and 
Wright (2012), each of which have tested some of the implications of existing theo-
ries with respect to the wage and employment effects of offshoring. Crinò (2010), 
who focuses on services offshoring, and Hummels et al. (2010), who focus on 
Denmark, both find positive wage and employment effects of offshoring for rela-
tively skilled workers, especially for those performing more complex production 
tasks, but find that less skilled workers may suffer displacement. Wright (2012) 
finds a positive productivity effect of offshoring for domestic firms but, on net, an 
aggregate decline in low-skill employment. Harrison and McMillan (2011) find 
that a crucial distinction is between “horizontal” and “vertical” offshoring (the first 
aimed at locally serving foreign markets and the second aimed at producing inter-
mediates that the multinational then re-imports to its domestic market), with the first 
hurting and the second stimulating domestic employment.
The present paper combines the above literature with the literature on the labor 
market effects of immigrants (e.g., Card 2001; Card 2009; Borjas 2003), proposing 
a common structure to think about offshoring and immigration within manufactur-
ing industries. To do this, we extend the offshoring model by Grossman and Rossi-
Hansberg (2008) to allow for immigration, which provides a simple, though still 
rich, way of thinking about these two phenomena within a unified framework. While 
the immigration literature has also analyzed the impact of immigrants on task allo-
cation and productivity (e.g., Peri and Sparber 2009; Peri 2012; Chassamboulli and 
Palivos 2010), we expand on it by considering a multi-sector environment and an 
open economy.4 What we find is that the joint analysis of immigration and  offshoring 
indeed generates novel insights that get overlooked when considering each of those 
two phenomena in isolation.
3 It is worth mentioning that this theory owes much to previous work on trade in intermediates, including 
seminal work by Jones and Kierzkowski (1990) and Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1999), who present models in 
which trade in intermediate goods has consequences for labor demand much like those described in Grossman and 
Rossi-Hansberg (2008).
4 Blinder (2007); Jensen and Kletzer (2007); Levy and Murnane (2006); and Becker, Ekholm, and 
Muendler (2009) find that tasks that intensively use cognitive-communication and non-routine skills are harder 
to offshore. Peri and Sparber (2009) find that immigrants have a comparative disadvantage (lower productivity) 
in performing communication-intensive tasks. None of these contributions, however, tackles the issue of the joint 
effects of offshoring and immigration on the employment shares, the employment levels and the task assignment of 
native, immigrant, and offshore workers as we do.
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The only other papers we are aware of that tackle the analysis of immigration and 
offshoring in a joint framework are Olney (2012) and Barba Navaretti, Bertola, and 
Sembenelli (2008). The first paper assumes that immigrants are identical to natives 
and that their variation across US states and industries is exogenous. Moreover, 
native workers are assumed to be immobile across states and industries so that the 
impacts of immigration or offshoring manifest themselves entirely through wages. 
We think our model and its derived empirical implementation constitute a step for-
ward from the reduced form approach of that study. The second paper presents a 
model of immigration and offshoring and tests its implications on firm-level data 
for Italy. It does not look, however, at the skill endowments of workers and the skill 
intensity of tasks nor at industry-level employment effects.
The importance of assortative matching between the skill requirements of tasks 
and the skill endowments of workers has been recently stressed by Costinot and 
Vogel (2010). By focusing on a Roy-like assignment model, in which a continuum 
of factors (“workers”) are employed to produce a continuum of goods (“tasks”), 
they show that the comparative advantage of high skill workers in high complex-
ity tasks provides sufficient conditions for rich comparative static predictions on 
the effects of various shocks to labor demand and supply. They explicitly analyze 
the consequences of easier offshoring, which they model as an increase in offshore 
labor productivity. Assuming that offshore workers have a comparative advantage in 
low complexity tasks, they conclude that easier offshoring induces task upgrading 
of all workers and rising wage inequality due to the increase in the effective supply 
of poorer low-skill workers. They do not consider immigration explicitly, but they 
discuss the effects of changes in the composition of labor supply. If one assumes 
that immigrants are relatively less skilled than natives, the impact of immigration is 
then similar to the impact of offshoring: task upgrading for all workers and increas-
ing wage inequality. Since our model also features a Roy-like assignment problem, 
their tools and techniques can be used to generalize our theoretical results, with two 
important differences. First, our focus is on the employment effects rather than on 
the wage effects. Second, our joint consideration of immigration and offshoring 
uncovers a differential response of native employment to shocks to the cost of immi-
grating or offshoring workers.5
Finally, also related to our paper is work on the determinants of “job polarization,” 
defined as rising employment shares in the highest and the lowest wage occupations 
(Autor, Katz, and Kearney 2006; Goos and Manning 2007). Three main explana-
tions of job polarization have been put forth: the technological substitution of non-
manual, routine jobs in the middle of the wage distribution (Katz and Autor 1999; 
Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2003); the offshoring of these jobs (Blinder 2007); or 
the “butlerization” or demand-driven explanation, whereby a rising income share 
at the top of the distribution leads to increased demand for low-skill services 
(Manning 2004). In summarizing the findings of this literature, Goos, Manning, and 
Salomons (2009) conclude that technical substitution of non-manual, routine jobs 
5 Costinot and Vogel (2010) are not the first to deal with assignment models in an international context. Applications 
to trade can be found, for instance, in Grossman and Maggi (2000); Grossman (2004); Yeaple (2005); Ohnsorge 
and Trefler (2007); Blanchard and Willmann (2011); Costinot (2009); Monte (2011); and Sly (2012). Examples 
of applications to offshoring are Kremer and Maskin (2006); Antràs, Garicano, and  Rossi-Hansberg (2006); and 
Nocke and Yeaple (2008). None of these papers, however, deals jointly with offshoring and immigration.
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seems to be a better explanation of job polarization than offshoring and butlerization 
because of the pervasive effect of technology across sectors and countries. The pres-
ent paper focuses on manufacturing jobs only, while also bringing immigration into 
the picture. We provide a somewhat different characterization of polarization in the 
US labor market, defined as the increasing difference in the types of jobs performed 
by immigrants relative to those performed by natives.
II. Data and Descriptive Statistics
In this section we present simple statistical evidence on US manufacturing indus-
tries that is consistent with a story of task specialization among native, immigrant, 
and offshore workers according to a specific pattern of comparative advantages. In 
particular, the data show that natives and immigrants have revealed comparative 
advantages in high and low complexity jobs, respectively. The revealed compara-
tive advantage of offshore workers is not directly observable. However two related 
facts are observed. First, the cognitive and communication intensities of native jobs 
are higher (and the manual intensity lower) in manufacturing industries in which 
offshoring is relatively important. Second, within manufacturing the cognitive, 
communication and manual intensities of native jobs are not related to the relative 
importance of immigration. Third, a positive and significant relationship between 
immigration and the cognitive and communication intensities of native jobs exists 
in non-manufacturing industries where offshoring is negligible. These facts sug-
gest that, in manufacturing industries, immigrants specialize in low complexity 
tasks, natives specialize in high complexity tasks and offshore workers specialize in 
intermediate complexity tasks. Specialization according to comparative advantages 
implies not only that immigration has a weaker “displacement effect” on natives 
relative to offshoring, but also that immigration and offshoring may generate a posi-
tive “productivity effect.”6 Again, it is important to note that throughout the paper 
we consider the complexity of a task to be increasing in the intensity of use of com-
munication and cognitive skills and decreasing in the manual content of the task.
We formalize this story in Section III through a simple theoretical model. 
Section IV then brings these predictions to the data. It should be noted that, while 
the theoretical model is designed to be consistent with the descriptive evidence that 
we present, the econometric scrutiny will involve a more rigorous methodology and 
will test moments of the data different from those on which the assumptions of the 
model are based.
A. Employment
To measure the employment of native, immigrant, and offshore workers in each 
industry-year using a consistent and comparable industry classification, we merge 
data on multinational employment from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) 
with data on native and foreign-born workers from the IPUMS samples (Ruggles 
et al. 2008) of the Census and the American Community Survey (ACS). The only 
6 In non-manufacturing sectors offshoring tasks is relatively costly. Thus tasks are assigned primarily to natives or 
immigrants with a higher likelihood of substitution between them. The productivity effect may still exist, however.
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years in which this merger can be consistently and reliably done are those from 2000 
to 2007. We therefore take these eight years as our period of observation.
Information on offshore employment is obtained from the BEA US Direct 
Investment Abroad dataset, which collects data on the operations of US parent com-
panies and their affiliates. From this dataset we obtain the total number of employees 
working abroad in foreign affiliates of US parent companies, by industry of the US 
parent.7 These are jobs directly generated abroad by multinationals.8 Data on native 
and immigrant workers come from the ACS and Census IPUMS samples for the 
period 2000–2007.9 We add up all workers not living in group quarters, who worked 
at least one week during the year, weighting them by the sample weights assigned 
by the ACS in order to make the sample nationally representative. “Immigrants” are 
all foreign-born workers who were not citizens at birth. “Natives” are all other US 
workers. The relevant industry classification in the Census-ACS data 2000–2007 
is the INDNAICS classification, which is based on the North American Industry 
Classification System (NAICS). Since the BEA industries are also associated with 
unique 4-digit NAICS industries, we are able to develop a straightforward concor-
dance between the two datasets.
The 58 industries on which we have data and their BEA codes are reported in 
Table A1 in the online Appendix, while Figure A1 (also in the online Appendix) 
reports the evolution of the employment shares of immigrant and offshore workers 
across industries in each year with the connecting lines showing averages over time. 
From 2000 to 2007 there was only a fairly modest increase in the overall share of 
immigrant and offshore employment in total manufacturing (the former increased 
from 12.8 percent to 14 percent and the latter from 22.3 percent to 29.3 percent). 
The figure shows both that all industries hired some immigrant and offshore  workers 
and, further, that the differences across industries are potentially large enough to 
allow for the identification of the differential effects of immigration and offshoring 
over the period.
While the employment shares of the different groups of workers vary across indus-
tries, there are interesting patterns of covariation. Panel A of Figure 1 depicts the 
correlations between native and immigrant employment shares over the period of 
observation. Panel B provides the same type of information for native and offshore 
workers and panel C shows employment shares for immigrant and offshore workers. 
7 As is standard in this literature, here we do not include in the definition of offshoring jobs that are subcontracted 
abroad by purely national firms.
8 Jobs created by US multinational firms outsourcing production to unaffiliated foreign subcontractors, so-called 
arm’s length offshoring (see, e.g. Antràs 2003) were not included in our analysis. We constructed a proxy for this 
variable, however. Assuming that a large part of the production output of these offshored jobs is subsequently 
imported as intermediate inputs by the US parent company, we calculated the ratio of imports of intermediates by 
the US parent coming from affiliates and employment in those affiliates. We then scaled the imports of the US par-
ent coming from non-affiliates (data that are also available from the BEA) by this ratio to impute the employment 
in subcontracting companies. This procedure assumes that the labor content per unit of production of subcontracted 
intermediate inputs is the same as for production in US affiliates in the same industry. Adding the imputed employ-
ment increases offshore employment by 60–80 percent in most industries, confirming the importance of arm’s 
length offshoring. The regression results using this measure of offshore employment are very similar to those 
presented in IV and we do not report them here. They can be found in a previous version of this paper (Ottaviano, 
Peri, and Wright 2010).
9 For year 2000 we use the 5 percent Census sample. For 2001 we use the 1-in-232 national random sample. 
For 2002, we use the 1-in-261 national random sample. For 2003 we use the 1-in-236 national random sample. For 
2004 we use the 1-in-239 national random sample. For 2005, 2006, and 2007 the 1-in-100 national random samples 
are used.
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Figure 1. Shares of Immigrant, Native, and Offshore Workers 
(58 manufacturing sectors, 2000–2007)
 
 Panel A. Native and immigrant employment shares; Slope of the regression line:
 0.05, standard error: 0.10
 
 
Panel B. Native and offshore employment shares; Slope of the regression line:
 –0.80, standard error: 0.02 
 
 
Panel C. Immigrants and offshore employment shares; Slope of the regression line:
 –0.19, standard error: 0.02 
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The figure reveals a lack of correlation between the shares of immigrant and native 
workers. In contrast, it highlights a strong negative correlation between the shares of 
offshore and native workers, and a significant (but less strong) negative correlation 
between the share of immigrants and offshore workers. These correlations suggest 
that competition for jobs may be strongest between natives and offshore workers, 
intermediate between immigrant and offshore workers and weakest between natives 
and immigrants.
Figure 2 looks at yearly employment- and wage-growth rates across 58 manufac-
turing industries over eight years. Panel A reveals a positive  correlation between the 
growth rates of employment of natives and immigrants whereas panel B shows no 
correlation between the growth of native and offshore workers. This is consistent 
with weaker native-immigrant employment competition relative to native-offshore 
worker competition in the presence of positive productivity effects due to both immi-
gration and offshoring. Panels C and D look at the correlations between changes in 
native wages and changes in immigrant and offshore employment.10 The two panels 
10 The wages of natives are constructed as follows. From the Census-ACS data we consider only US-born indi-
viduals who are employed (i.e., who have worked at least one week in the year and at least one hour in the week) 
and who have non-zero wage income, excluding the self-employed. We take yearly wage income deflated by the 
Panel A. Slope of the regression line: 0.13, 
standard error: 0.03 
Panel B. Slope of the regression line: 0.01, 
standard error: 0.01 
Panel C. Slope of the regression line: −0.02, 
standard error: 0.02  
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do not suggest any significant correlation between changes in native wages and 
changes in immigrant and offshore employment across sectors. We interpret this 
as consistent with the equalization of native wages across manufacturing industries 
due to worker mobility between them, with the effect that the wage variation across 
sectors is random.11
B. Tasks
Data on the tasks performed by immigrants and natives is constructed using the 
US Department of Labor’s (2012) O*NET abilities survey, which provides informa-
tion on the characteristics of each occupation. Based on the Standard Occupation 
Classification (SOC), the dataset assigns numerical values to describe the impor-
tance of distinct abilities (“skills”) required by different occupations (“tasks”). Each 
numerical value measures the intensity of a skill in a given task. Following Peri and 
Sparber (2009), we merge these task-specific values with individual workers in the 
2000 Census, re-scaling each value so that it equals the percentile score in that year. 
This gives a measure of the relative importance of a given skill among US workers 
ranging between zero and one. For instance, a task with a score of 0.02 for some skill 
indicates that only 2 percent of workers in the United States in 2000 were supplying 
that skill less intensively. We then assign these O*NET percentile scores to individuals 
from 2000 to 2007 using the ACS variable occ1990, which provides an occupational 
crosswalk over time.
We focus on three skill indices: Cognitive Intensity, Communication Intensity, 
and Manual Intensity. These are constructed by averaging the relevant skill vari-
ables. Specifically, Cognitive Intensity includes ten variables classified as “cogni-
tive and analytical” in O*NET. Communication Intensity includes four variables 
capturing written and oral expression and understanding. Manual Intensity includes 
nineteen variables capturing dexterity, strength, and coordination.12 We have also 
calculated a synthetic Complexity index summarizing the intensity of a task in 
cognitive- communication skills relative to manual skills. This index is defined 
as: Complexity = ln((Cognitive Intensity + Communication Intensity)/Manual 
Intensity). It ranges between −∞ and +∞.
Overall, our sample consists of 295 occupations (“tasks”) in the manufacturing 
sector over eight years, 2000–2007. This type of information is available for immi-
grants and natives but not for offshore workers. Absent direct information on the 
specific occupations of offshore workers, a crucial challenge for us is to indirectly 
assess the average complexity of offshore tasks. The four panels of Figure 3 plot the 
share of hours worked by immigrants relative to the total number of hours worked by 
immigrant and native workers as a function of Cognitive Intensity, Communication 
consumption price index to constant 2005 dollars and average it at the industry level, weighting each individual by 
the corresponding sample weight in the Census.
11 We also provide a more formal analysis of the correlation between offshore/immigrant employment and 
native wages in the online Appendix. Table A3 shows the estimated effects of log offshore employment and log 
immigrant employment on (log) native wages. The effects are estimated using 2SLS with tariffs as an instrument for 
offshoring and imputed immigration as an instrument for actual immigration (as described in Section IVA below). 
In all cases we obtain small and insignificant coefficients.
12 The exact definition and list of the variables used for each index can be found in the online Appendix of this 
paper.
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Intensity, Manual Intensity, and Complexity across occupation-years.13 The figure 
clearly shows that immigrants are disproportionately represented in  occupations 
characterized by low Cognitive Intensity, low Communication Intensity, high 
Manual Intensity, and low overall Complexity.14
While the complexity of offshored tasks is unobservable (because we do not 
observe offshore occupations), we can nonetheless gauge some indirect evidence 
from the way offshoring affects the complexity of native and immigrant tasks. 
Figure 4 reports this type of information in the case of all immigrants and natives. 
It plots the change in the Complexity of tasks performed by natives and immigrants 
against the change in the shares of offshore and immigrant employment, across 
manufacturing industries over the period 2000–2007. The figure conveys a clear 
13 A very similar picture would be obtained if we only considered workers with low educational attainment (i.e., 
workers with a high school diploma or less) This was shown in Ottaviano, Peri, and Wright (2010). Even within 
the low educated, immigrants are relatively specialized in tasks with low cognitive and communication content, low 
complexity and high manual content.
14 This finding concurs with existing evidence. Peri and Sparber (2009) show that, due to their imperfect knowl-
edge of language and local norms, immigrants have a relative advantage in tasks with high manual intensity and a 
relative disadvantage in tasks with high communication intensity.
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Figure 3. Immigrants and Task Complexity (across occupations)
Notes: Sample is 295 occupations over 2000–2007. Only occupations with over 5,000 workers are reported.
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message: increases in the share of offshore workers are associated with significant 
increases in the complexity of tasks performed by natives as well as decreases in 
the complexity of tasks performed by immigrants. In contrast, increases in the share 
of immigrants are not associated with any significant change in the complexity of 
native or immigrant tasks. Hence, a stronger presence of offshore workers is associ-
ated with a larger polarization in task complexity between natives and  immigrants. 
Similar patterns arise when we focus on Cognitive Intensity, Communication 
Intensity, and Manual Intensity separately but we do not report them for conciseness.
The finding that changes in native complexity are not significantly correlated with 
changes in the share of immigrants may surprise readers familiar with Peri and 
Sparber (2009), as these authors find that native task complexity is sensitive to the 
share of immigrants. This can easily be explained in a manner that is consistent 
with our theory. In this study we focus on (mostly-tradable) manufacturing indus-
tries whereas Peri and Sparber (2009) consider all employment, most of which is 
in ( non-tradable) services. Since offshoring was still negligible outside the manu-
facturing sector during our period of observation, we interpret this discrepancy as a 
signal that, when viable, offshore workers play an important role in weakening the 
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competition between immigrants and natives. Table 1 explores this interpretation 
by regressing native complexity on immigrants’ complexity and employment share 
across industries and over time, distinguishing between manufacturing (“tradable”) 
and non-manufacturing (“non-tradable”) industries. All workers are included. The 
table shows significant positive correlation between native complexity and immigrant 
employment share within non-tradable industries (column 2), but no correlation is 
detected between native complexity and immigrant employment share in tradable 
industries (column 1).15 This supports the idea that in non-tradable industries the 
competition between natives and immigrants is more direct and immigration pushes 
native workers to “upgrade” their jobs. In tradable industries this does not happen 
because offshore workers perform a large part of the intermediate- complex tasks 
and are therefore in direct competition with immigrants. While the results shown are 
not direct evidence of this, they are consistent with this explanation.
Our overall interpretation of the descriptive evidence presented in this section is that 
natives compete more directly with offshore workers relative to immigrant workers. 
This can be explained by a specific pattern of comparative advantages across the three 
groups of workers, with immigrants specializing in low  complexity tasks, natives in 
high complexity tasks and offshore workers in intermediate  complexity tasks.
III. A Labor Market Model of Task Allocation
A simple partial equilibrium model consistent with the descriptive evi-
dence reported in the previous section can be designed following Grossman and 
 Rossi-Hansberg (2008). Consider a small open economy that is active in several 
perfectly competitive sectors, indexed s = 1, … , S. We focus on one of these sectors 
15 In the regressions in Table 1 we also control for time and industry fixed effects.
Table 1—Complexity of Native and Immigrant Share in Tradable 
versus Non-Tradable Industries
Dependent variable is the 
complexity index for natives Complexity = ln[(Cognitive + Communication)/Manual]
Tradable sectors, 
2000–2007
Non-tradable sectors, 
2000–2007
(1) (2)
Complexity index for the 0.04** 0.07**
 foreign-born (0.02) (0.01)
Share of foreign-born −0.01 0.15**
(0.09) (0.07)
Industry effects Yes Yes
Observations  647 1,456
Notes: The estimation method is ordinary least squares including industry and time effects. 
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, clustered at the sector level are reported.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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and leave both the sector index s and the time dependence of variables t implicit for 
ease of notation. We will make them explicit when we get to the empirics.
The sector employs two primary factors, workers with employment level  N L and 
a sector-specific factor with endowment H. To match the descriptive evidence on 
wages in Section II, the sector is small enough to face infinitely elastic labor sup-
ply at given wages.16 All workers are endowed with one unit of labor each but dif-
fer in terms of productivity. They are employed in the production of intermediates 
(“tasks”), which are then assembled in a composite labor input L. This, in turn, is 
transformed into final output Y according to the following Cobb-Douglas production 
function:
(1) Y = A L α  H 1−α ,
where A ∈ (0, ∞) and α ∈ (0, 1) are technological parameters. The price of final 
output  p Y is set in the international market.
Specifically, the composite labor input L is produced by assembling a fixed mea-
sure of differentiated tasks, indexed i ∈ [0, 1] in increasing order of complexity, 
through the following CES technology:
(2) L =  [ ∫ 
0
 1 L ( i )  σ−1 _σ   di ]  σ _ σ−1  ,
where L ( i )  is the input of task i and σ > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between 
tasks.17
A. Task Assignment
Each task can be managed in three modes: domestic production by native  workers 
(D), domestic production by immigrant workers (M ), and production abroad by 
offshore workers (O). The three groups of workers are perfect substitutes in the 
production of any task but differ in terms of their productivity as well as in terms of 
their wages, which we call w,  ˜  w , and  w ∗ , respectively. To allow for a “productivity 
effect” to arise from both immigration and offshoring, we assume that employers 
can discriminate between the three groups of workers so that w,  ˜  w , and  w ∗ may 
not be equal. We assume, however, that immigrant and offshore wages are linked, 
with a fixed gap between them determined by a differential “cost of hardship” that 
immigrants face with respect to their fellow countrymen who stay at home. In par-
ticular, if a foreign worker immigrates, she incurs a frictional cost δ ≥ 1 in terms of 
foregone productivity. In other words, an immigrant endowed with one unit of labor 
in her country of origin is able to provide only 1/δ units of labor in the country of 
16 This leads to a crucial difference between our model and those by Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) and 
by Costinot and Vogel (2010). Both these models consider the general equilibrium effects of offshoring on wages 
under economy-wide full employment constraints. In the online Appendix we propose an extension of our model in 
which the assumption of perfectly elastic labor supply at given wages does not hold. There we show that, when the 
native wage is endogenous, immigration and offshoring generate wage effects, however the corresponding employ-
ment effects discussed in Section IIIB remain qualitatively the same.
17 In Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) tasks are not substitutable. This corresponds to the limit case of 
σ = 0 where (2) becomes a Leontief production function.
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destination. The migration decision therefore entails a choice between earning  w ∗ 
in the country of origin or  ˜  w /δ in the country of destination.18 Positive supply of 
both immigrant and offshore workers then requires the migration indifference con-
dition  ˜  w =  w ∗ δ to hold.19
In light of the descriptive evidence reported in Section II, we now introduce 
assumptions that ensure that immigrant, offshore, and native workers specialize 
in low, medium, and high complexity tasks, respectively. In so doing, we follow 
Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) and define tasks so that they all require the 
same unit labor requirement  a L when performed by native workers. Accordingly, 
the marginal cost of producing task i employing native workers is  c D (i) = w a L . If 
task i is instead offshored, its unit input requirement is β t(i) a L with β t(i) ≥ 1. This 
implies a marginal cost of producing task i employing offshore workers equal to 
 c O (i) =  w ∗ β t(i) a L . Lastly, if task i is assigned to immigrants, its unit input require-
ment is τ (i) a L with τ (i) ≥ 1 so that the marginal cost of producing task i employing 
immigrants is  c M (i) =  ˜ w τ (i) a L =  w ∗ δ τ (i) a L . Hence, in all tasks natives are more 
productive but, due to wage differences, not necessarily cheaper than immigrant and 
offshore workers. We interpret a lower value of the frictional parameter β as “easier 
offshoring” and a lower value of the frictional parameter δ as “easier immigration.”
Since native, immigrant and offshore workers are perfectly substitutable, in equi-
librium any task will be performed by only one type of worker: the one that entails 
the lowest marginal cost for that task.20 Hence, a set of sufficient conditions for 
immigrant, offshore and native workers to specialize in low, medium and high com-
plexity tasks can be stated as:
PROPOSITION 1: Suppose
(3)  dt(i) _
di
  > 0,   w _  w ∗ t(1) < β <  
w _  w ∗ t(0) .
 Then there exists a unique “marginal offshore task”  I NO ∈ (0, 1) such that 
 c O ( I NO ) =  c D ( I NO ),  c O (i) <  c D (i) for all i ∈ [0,  I NO ) and  c O (i) >  c D (i) for all 
i ∈ ( I NO , 1]. This task is implicitly defined by w =  w ∗ βt( I NO ). Suppose in addition 
that
(4) δ  dτ (i) _
di
  > β  dt(i) _
di
  ,   τ (0) _
t(0)  <  
β _ δ <  
τ ( I NO ) _
t( I NO )  .
18 For simplicity, in the theoretical model we consider only one country of origin for all immigrants.
19 There is much empirical evidence that, for similar observable characteristics, immigrants are paid a lower wage 
than natives. Using data from the 2000 Census, Antecol, Cobb-Clark, and Trejo (2001); Butcher and DiNardo (2002); 
and Chiswick, Lee, and Miller (2005) all show that recent immigrants from non-English speaking countries earn on 
average 17 to 20 percent less than natives with identical observable characteristics. Our data provide estimates in the 
same ball park. Hendricks (2002) also shows that the immigrant-native wage differential, controlling for observable 
characteristics, is highly correlated with the wage differential between the United States and their country of origin. 
See, however, Section IIIB and the online Appendix for a detailed discussion of how the predictions of the model 
would change were firms assumed to be unable to discriminate between native and immigrant workers.
20 If native, immigrant and offshore workers were imperfectly substitutable, each task could be performed by 
“teams” consisting of the three types of workers. Then, rather than full specialization of workers’ types in differ-
ent tasks, one would observe partial specialization, with the shares of the three types in each task inversely related 
to the corresponding marginal costs. In reality several tasks are indeed performed by a combination of different 
types of workers, nonetheless the intuition behind the key results of the model is better served by assuming perfect 
substitutability.
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 Then there exists a unique “marginal immigrant task”  I MO ∈ (0,  I NO ) such that 
 c M ( I MO ) =  c O ( I MO ),  c M (i) <  c O (i) for all i ∈ [0,  I MO ) and  c M (i) >  c O (i) for all 
i ∈ ( I MO , 1]. This task is implicitly defined by βt( I MO ) = δτ ( I MO ).
See the Appendix for the proof. Intuitively, the first condition in (3) implies 
that the productivity of offshore workers relative to natives decreases with the 
complexity of tasks. The second condition in (3) requires offshoring frictions to 
be neither too large nor too small in order to generate a trade-off in the assign-
ment of tasks between native and offshore workers. The first condition in (4) also 
implies that the productivity of immigrants falls with the complexity of tasks, 
and falls faster than in the case of offshore workers. The second condition in (4) 
requires offshoring  frictions to be neither too large nor too small relative to migra-
tion frictions such that there is a trade-off in the assignment of tasks between 
immigrant and offshore  workers. Conditions (3) and (4) together thus imply that 
tasks of complexity 0 ≤ i ≤  I MO are assigned to immigrants, tasks of complex-
ity  I MO < i ≤  I NO to offshore workers and tasks of complexity  I NO < i ≤ 1 to 
natives, where marginal tasks have been arbitrarily assigned to break the tie.21
The allocation of tasks among the three groups of workers is portrayed in 
Figure 5, where the task index i is measured along the horizontal axis and the 
production costs along the vertical axis. The flat line corresponds to  c D and the 
upward sloping curves correspond to  c M (i) and  c O (i), with the former starting 
from below but steeper than the latter. Since each task employs only the type 
of workers yielding the lowest marginal cost, tasks from 0 to  I MO are assigned 
to immigrants, tasks from  I MO to  I NO are offshored, and tasks from  I NO to 1 are 
assigned to natives.
B. Comparative Statics
We are interested in how tasks, employment shares, and employment levels, vary 
across the three types of workers when offshoring and migration costs change. 
The solution of our task assignment problem summarized in Proposition 1 implies 
that marginal tasks exhibit the following properties:
  ∂ I NO  _∂β  < 0,    
∂ I MO  _∂β  > 0
  ∂ I NO  _∂δ  = 0,    
∂ I MO  _∂δ  < 0.
21 Readers familiar with Costinot and Vogel (2010) will recognize the log-supermodularity of this assignment 
problem in which, due to their different skills, native, immigrant, and offshore workers have a relative advantage in 
high, medium, and low skill intensity tasks. Indeed, the approach of Costinot and Vogel (2010) could be used to go 
beyond the stark view expressed in our theory by introducing skill heterogeneity among the three groups of workers. 
This could be achieved by matching the assumption that higher skill workers have a comparative advantage in more 
skill intensive tasks (see Costinot and Vogel 2010, Section IIIA) with the assumption that natives are more skilled 
relative to offshore and immigrant workers (see Costinot and Vogel 2010, Section VIIB).
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These highlight the adjustments in employment occurring in terms of the number 
of tasks allocated to the three groups of workers. They can be readily understood 
using Figure 5. For example, a reduction in offshoring costs (lower β) shifts  c O (i) 
downward, thus increasing the number of offshored tasks through a reduction in 
both the number of tasks assigned to immigrants (∂ I MO /∂β > 0) and the number of 
tasks assigned to natives (∂ I NO /∂β < 0). Analogously, a reduction in the migration 
costs (lower δ) shifts  c M (i) downward, thus increasing the number of tasks assigned 
to immigrants through a decrease in the number of offshored tasks (higher  I MO ).
While the theoretical model identifies the marginal tasks as cutoffs between tasks 
performed by different groups of workers, the distinction is not so stark in reality as 
workers are also heterogeneous within groups and some overlap among individu-
als belonging to different groups is possible along the complexity spectrum.22 For 
the empirical analysis it is, therefore, also useful to characterize the “average task,” 
 I M ,  I O , or  I D , performed by each group, defined as the employment-weighted average 
across the corresponding is.23 Average tasks exhibit the following properties:
(5)  ∂ I D  _∂β  < 0,    
∂ I M  _∂β  > 0
  ∂ I D  _∂δ  = 0,    
∂ I M  _∂δ  < 0.
22 See the previous footnote on how the model could be extended to the case of within-group heterogeneity.
23 See the Appendix for a formal definition of average tasks.
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These are driven by compositional changes due to adjustments both in the number 
of tasks allocated to the three groups and in the employment shares of the different 
tasks allocated to the three groups. Note that changes in migration costs also have a 
negative impact on the average offshored task (∂ I O /∂δ < 0). The impact of offshor-
ing costs on the average offshore task (∂ I O /∂β) is, instead, ambiguous. This is due 
to opposing adjustments in the allocation of tasks given that, when β falls, some 
of the additional offshore tasks have low i (i.e.,  I MO falls) while others have high i (i.e.,  I NO rises).
The impacts of declining β and δ on employment shares,  s M ,  s O , and  s D , are all 
unambiguous.24 By making offshore workers more productive and thus reducing the 
price index of offshore tasks  P O relative to the price index of all tasks  P L , a lower 
offshoring cost, β, reallocates tasks from immigrants and natives to offshore work-
ers. By reducing the price index of immigrant tasks  P M relative to the price index of 
all tasks  P L , a lower migration cost, δ, moves tasks away from offshore and native 
workers toward immigrants:
(6)  ∂ s M  _∂β > 0,    
∂ s O  _∂β < 0,    
∂ s D  _∂β > 0
  ∂ s M  _∂δ <  0,    
∂ s O  _∂δ > 0,    
∂ s D  _∂δ > 0.
These results capture the signs of the “displacement effects” for the three groups of 
workers.
Turning to the impact of declining β and δ on the employment levels  N M ,  N O , and 
N D , there is an additional effect beyond the substitution among groups of workers in 
terms of employment shares.25 This is due to the fact that lower β and δ ultimately 
cause a fall in the price index of the labor composite  P L because, as a whole, workers 
become more productive. This is the “productivity effect” of offshoring and immi-
gration. Specifically, a fall in the price index  P L of the labor composite has a posi-
tive impact on sectoral employment (due to the productivity effect), which is then 
distributed across groups depending on how the relative price indices of the three 
groups of workers  P M / P L ,  P O / P L , and  P D / P L vary (due to the displacement effects).
The impact of declining β and δ on employment levels can be signed only when 
the productivity effect and the displacement effects go in the same direction. In par-
ticular, since ∂ P L /∂β > 0 and ∂ P L /∂δ > 0, we have
(7)  ∂ N O  _∂β  < 0,    
∂ N M  _∂δ  < 0,
while the signs of ∂ N M /∂β, ∂ N D /∂β, ∂ N O /∂δ, and ∂ N D /∂δ are generally ambigu-
ous. In other words, whether the productivity effect is strong enough to offset the 
displacement effect for all groups of workers is an empirical question that we will 
24 See the Appendix for the expressions of employment shares and price indices.
25 See the Appendix for the expressions of employment levels.
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address in the next section. Lower β and δ certainly raise total sector employment 
N L =  N M +  N O +  N D , as long as there is a non-zero productivity effect.
Results (5), (6), and (7) are the reduced form implications of the model that we 
will bring to the data in the next sections.26
IV. Empirical Specifications and Econometric Results
In this section we bring the predictions of our model to the data. We target the 
three sets of predictions highlighted in the previous section regarding the effects of 
easier immigration and easier offshoring on the employment shares, the employ-
ment levels and the average task assignments of natives and of the other groups of 
workers, as highlighted in (5), (6), and (7), respectively. The empirical specifica-
tions are derived from the theory but can be justified in a very general way. First, the 
impact of immigration or offshoring on the share of native employment allows us to 
infer the degree of direct competition (substitutability) between types of workers. 
Second, estimating the impact of immigration or offshoring on total employment 
allows us to quantify the productivity effects of those activities. Finally, the impact 
of immigration or offshoring on native task assignment tests whether the distribu-
tion of tasks across worker types according to task complexity is consistent with our 
hypothesis and with the estimated pattern of cross-substitution.
The predictions of the model have been derived for a single industry leaving 
industry and time indices implicit for notational convenience. Hence, in order to 
implement (5), (6), and (7) empirically we begin by identifying the parameters that 
vary across industries (to be indexed by s) and over time (to be indexed by t) and 
those that do not (and carry no index). First, the offshoring and immigration cost 
parameters vary across industries and over time, and thus we label them  β st and δ st . We motivate this in Section IVA in which we present our empirical measures. 
Second, we consider the specific factor endowment  H s to be industry-specific but 
not time-varying. The same holds for the baseline sector-specific total factor pro-
ductivity  A s . We allow, however, for random productivity shocks through a possibly 
serially correlated error term  ε st . Both  H s and  A s will be captured by an industry fixed 
effect. Finally, as wages have been assumed to be equalized across industries, we 
allow them to vary only over time, writing  w t and  w t ∗ , which calls for a time effect.
In sum, we will exploit differences in immigration and offshoring costs within 
industries over time in order to identify the impact on native and immigrant employ-
ment as well as on native and immigrant task specialization.
A. Costs of Immigration and Offshoring
Driving the shifts in  β st and  δ st are changes in the accessibility of offshore and 
immigrant workers. Since we do not observe industry-specific offshoring and 
26 Employers’ ability to discriminate between natives and immigrants is crucial for the productivity effects of 
immigration to materialize. If employers were unable to discriminate, immigrants would always be paid native 
wages w earning rents w −  w ∗ δ. Thus, any reduction in δ would simply increase immigrants’ rents with no impact 
on firms’ costs. Note, however, that our assumption of perfect discrimination is not crucial to generate the pro-
ductivity effect due to immigration since even partial discrimination generates rents for the firm. See the online 
Appendix for additional details.
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 immigration costs, we begin by using direct measures of the employment share of 
immigrant and offshore workers across industries and over time as explanatory vari-
ables. If the variation in costs, once we control for industry and time effects, were 
the main source of variation in immigration and offshoring within an industry, then 
the OLS regression would identify the effect on native outcomes of changes in the 
cost of immigration and offshoring. As we are aware that this is an heroic assump-
tion, we instrument the share of immigrants and offshore workers with variables 
proxying their cross-industry costs and availability.
The assumption that offshoring costs vary across industries departs from 
Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), who suggest that this cost is more or less 
the same across industries. This is probably true if one wants to stress, as they do, 
the technological dimension of offshoring costs, which implies very little varia-
tion across similar tasks in different industries. Our focus is, instead, on the trade 
cost dimension of offshoring, which hampers the re-import of the output gener-
ated by offshored tasks and is affected by industry-specific characteristics. In this 
respect, in order to capture exogenous variation in offshoring costs and generate an 
instrument for offshore employment in an industry-year, we collect two types of 
US tariff data, each by year and product: Most Favored Nation (MFN) tariffs and 
Information Technology Agreement (ITA) tariffs.27 These are then aggregated up to 
the BEA industry level for each year, weighting the tariffs by the value of imports 
in each detailed industry, where we obtain US imports from Feenstra, Romalis, and 
Schott (2002).28 We call this variable (Tariffs ) st .
The instrument we use to proxy cost-driven immigration by industry and year 
extends the method first proposed by Altonji and Card (1991) and Card (2001) to 
identify cost-driven local shifts in immigrants. We exploit the fact that foreigners 
from different countries have increased or decreased their relative presence in the 
United States according to changes in the cost of migrating and to domestic condi-
tions that are specific to their countries of origin. Differences in the initial presence 
of immigrants from different countries in an industry make that industry more or less 
subject to those shifts in origin-specific cost- and push-factors. Using these two facts 
we impute the population of each of 10 main groups of immigrants across industries 
over time.29 Specifically, we use the share of immigrant workers, by origin-group, in 
each industry in year 2000 and we augment it by the aggregate growth rate of the spe-
cific immigrant group’s population in the United States relative to the total US popu-
lation. Then summing over origin-groups within an industry we obtain the imputed 
share of foreign-born in total employment. We call this measure (Im puted_ s M ) st 
and note that it varies across industries and over time.30
27 These data come primarily from UNCTAD’s TRAINS dataset, but were extended somewhat by Yingying Xu 
(2006) as part of her dissertation at UC Davis. The ITA data was added by the authors. ITA data is available via 
http://www.wto.org
28 The MFN tariffs are mandated for all WTO signatories, while the ITA tariffs had been adopted by 43 countries 
at the end of our period (2007), covering 97 percent of world trade in technology products. The ITA covers a range 
of manufactured technology products (see the online Appendix for a full list of products and adopters) and, for our 
purposes, is an important source of time-series variation, as MFN tariffs do not change much within industries over 
our period.
29 The ten countries/regions of origin are: Mexico, Rest of Latin America, Canada-Australia-New Zealand, 
Western Europe, Eastern Europe, China, India, Rest of Asia, Africa, and Other.
30 This index is similar to the constructed shift-share instrument often used in studies of immigration in local 
labor markets (e.g., Card 2001; Card and DiNardo 2000; Peri and Sparber 2009), except that it exploits differences 
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Our identification approach is valid as long as industries, like localities, are 
important conduits for immigrant networks. This is likely to be more true for indus-
tries that are geographically concentrated. In Section IVE we focus exclusively on 
industries that are highly concentrated geographically. Because of localized ethnic 
networks (Bartel 1989), we would expect that the initial distribution of immigrants 
in such industries would be an even stronger predictor of future immigration flows.
B. Effects on Employment Shares
We begin by estimating the impact of variation in immigration and offshoring 
costs on the shares of native, immigrant, and offshore workers, thereby exploring 
the relative substitutability of these worker types through the extent to which they 
displace one another. In Section IVC we will then analyze the impact on the employ-
ment levels of these groups, which includes the productivity impact of the chang-
ing costs of immigration and offshoring. Finally, in Section IVD, we will explore 
the impact on the task specialization of natives and immigrants. Using the same 
notation as we used in the theoretical model but making industry and time indices 
explicit as discussed above, we implement (B4) empirically by estimating the fol-
lowing three regressions:
(8)  s Dst =  ϕ s D +  ϕ t D +  b DO ( s Ost ) +  b DM ( s Mst ) +  ε st D
(9)  s Mst =  ϕ s M +  ϕ t M +  b MO ( s Ost ) +  ε st M 
(10)  s Ost =  ϕ s O +  ϕ t O +  b OM ( s Mst ) +  ε st O ,
where  s Dst ,  s Ost , and  s Mst are the employment shares of domestic (native), 
 offshore and immigrant workers in industry s at time t, the  ϕ s s are industry fixed 
effects, the  ϕ t s are time effects, and the  ε st s are (potentially) serially correlated 
errors. Estimation is based on 2SLS using the instruments (Tariffs ) st for  s Ost and (Im puted_ s M ) st for  s Mst as described in Section IVA.
Equation (8) estimates the impact of variation in the offshoring and immigration 
share, driven by push and cost factors as captured by (Tariffs ) st and (Im puted_ s M ) st , 
on native workers’ share of employment. By including industry effects we only 
exploit variation within industries over time. We also control for common-year 
effects and, as a result, any time-invariant difference in offshoring costs across 
industries and any common trend in offshoring costs over time will not contribute to 
the identification of the effect. Equation (9) estimates the effect of variation in off-
shoring costs on the immigrant share of employment and, conversely, equation (10) 
estimates the effect on the share of offshore workers due to a decrease in immigra-
tion costs.
Specifications (8) to (10) combine two desirable features. First, the coefficients 
can be easily interpreted as the percentage variation in native (immigrant/offshore) 
in the presence of immigrant groups (from different countries) across industries, rather than across localities. There 
are some recent papers that document the existence of industry- and occupation-specific immigrant networks (e.g., 
Patel and Vella 2007), arising in part due to the geographic concentration of industries.
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employment in response to a 1 percent change in immigrant/offshore employment. 
In addition, since we use (Tariffs ) st and (Im puted_ s M ) st as instruments we only rely on 
variation driven by changes in the costs of immigration and offshoring. These will be 
our main specifications. Alternatively, we could regress employment shares directly 
on the constructed measures of offshoring costs (Tariffs ) st and ease of immigration (Im puted_ s M ) st . This is more consistent with the model, as we can interpret (Tariffs ) st 
as a measure of  β st (cost of offshoring) and (Im puted_ s M ) st as an inverse measure 
of  δ st (cost of migration). However the quantitative interpretation of the coefficient 
will be less straightforward (because the constructed  variables have a somewhat 
arbitrary scale). The significance and sign of the estimates,  however, should be con-
sistent. We will use this more direct regression as an alternative specification.
From Section IIIB the predictions of the model are as follows:  b DO < 0,  b DM ≈ 0, 
b MO < 0, and  b OM < 0. Table 2 reports the estimated effects. First, columns 1 and 
2 show the 2SLS effects of increasing shares of immigrant and offshore workers on 
the share of native workers. Because the shares must sum to 1, the immigrant and 
offshore worker shares are collinear, and so we must estimate their effects separately 
(as the sole regressors in separate regressions). We therefore estimate each effect, 
with instrumental variables. In column 1 we use the tariff measure as an instru-
ment for the offshore share of employment while in column 2 we use the imputed 
Table 2—Effects of Offshoring and Immigration on Employment Shares
Native share of employment
Immigrant share of 
employment
Offshore share of 
employment
2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS
Specifications
IV, One 
instrument
IV, One 
instrument
Direct OLS 
regression
Direct OLS 
regression
IV, One 
instrument
Direct OLS 
regression
IV, One 
instrument
Direct OLS 
regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Immigrant share −0.46 −0.53
 of employment (0.39) (0.39)
Offshore share −0.79** −0.21**
 of employment (0.07) (0.07)
Industry fixed
 effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First stage: 
Offshore 
share of 
employment
Immigrant 
share of 
employment
Offshore 
share of 
employment
Immigrant 
share of 
employment
Imputed sector- 1.95** −0.91 1.90**  −1.03
 specific share
 of immigrants
(0.55) (1.16) (0.48) (0.94)
Sector-specific −0.06** 0.036* −0.06** 0.01*
 tariffs (0.01) (0.022) (0.01) (0.005)
Observations 464 464 464 464 464 464 464 464
Wald F-stat of 
 first stage
16.6 12.5 NA NA 16.6 NA 12.5 NA
Notes: The dependent variable in each regression is specified at the top of the relative columns. The units of obser-
vations are industry by year. All regressions include industry and year effects. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors are reported in parenthesis. In the OLS regressions the standard errors are also clustered by industry. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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immigration shares to instrument actual immigration.31 The impact of the cost of 
offshoring (tariffs) and ease of immigration (imputed immigrants) on the explana-
tory variables, displayed in the first stage of the regressions, is quite significant and 
has the expected sign. Furthermore, the measures of ease of offshoring and migra-
tion are strong instruments, with a Wald F-statistic that is above the Stock and Yogo 
critical value (15 percent maximal IV size) equal to 8.96 (see last row of Table 2). 
Columns 3 and 4 show the coefficients from the corresponding “direct regressions.” 
The native share of employment is regressed directly on the sector-specific tariff 
(column 3) and on the imputed immigration (specification 4). Columns 5 and 6 
report the effects of variation in offshoring costs on the share of immigrants, first 
using the 2SLS specification and then the direct regression with tariffs as a mea-
sure of offshoring costs. Columns 7 and 8 show the effect of variation in immigra-
tion costs on the share of offshore workers either directly (specification 8) or using 
imputed migration as an instrument for the share of immigrants (specification 7). 
The standard errors reported in each regression are heteroskedasticity robust and, in 
the case of the OLS regressions, they are clustered at the industry level to account 
for potential serial correlation of errors.
The results are encouraging as the four predictions of the model are mostly 
matched by the estimates and the 2SLS and the direct OLS regressions provide the 
same qualitative evidence. Focussing on the 2SLS coefficients, and looking along 
the first row, we see that increased immigration in an industry has a non-significant 
effect on the share of native employment in that industry and a negative (but margin-
ally non-significant, with a p-value of 0.18) effect on the share of offshore employ-
ment (recall that the model predicted no effect on natives and a negative effect on 
immigrants, respectively). Stronger results are obtained in the second row, which 
shows that there is a negative effect of offshore employment on the share of both 
native and immigrant workers in an industry, exactly as predicted in (6). Each of the 
estimates is significantly different from zero. Similarly, the direct regression coef-
ficients show that an increase in the cost of offshoring (tariffs) has a positive and sig-
nificant effect on the native and immigrant share of employment, while an increase 
in the ease of immigration has a negative (but non-significant) effect on the offshore 
share and a non-significant effect on the native share of employment.
These findings are in line with our model. More generally, they suggest that immi-
grants and natives compete more with offshore workers than with one another. This 
is consistent with a large part of the labor literature (e.g., Card 2001; or Ottaviano 
and Peri 2012) that does not find a significant negative impact of immigrants on 
native employment. Moreover, the decline in offshoring costs is shown to have a 
significant impact on the employment share of natives and immigrants, but one that 
is quantitatively larger for the first group. This suggests that over the eight years 
considered (2000–2007) the tasks that were offshored were more likely to be at the 
high end of the task spectrum for offshore workers.
31 Using the definition of offshore employment that is inclusive of arm’s length offshoring we obtain an effect of 
off-shoring on native share—in a specification as that in column 1—equal to −0.71, (with a standard error of 0.18). 
The estimated effect on the immigrant share—in a specification as that in column 5—is −0.29, (with a standard 
error of 0.18).
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C. Effects on Employment Levels
Another important implication of our model, highlighted in Section IIIB, is the 
existence of a “productivity effect” that results from the cost decline associated 
with hiring immigrant and offshore workers. Such an effect leads to an increase in 
the aggregate demand for all worker types. This productivity effect, if significant, 
combined with the effect on shares described in the previous section, should imply 
a mitigated, or perhaps even positive effect of offshoring on native employment. 
Additionally, immigration should have a positive effect on native employment.
Table 3, which replicates the structure of Table 2, presents the estimated coeffi-
cients from the following four regressions:
(11)  N Dst =  ϕ s D +  ϕ t D +  B DO ( N Ost ) +  B DM ( N Mst ) +  ε st D
(12)  N Mst =  ϕ s M +  ϕ t M +  B MO ( N Ost ) +  ε st M 
(13)  N Ost =  ϕ s O +  ϕ t O +  B OM ( N Mst ) +  ε st O ,
Table 3—Effects of Offshoring and Immigration on Employment Levels
ln(native employment) ln(immigrant employment) ln(offshore employment)
2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS
Specifications
IV, One 
instrument
IV, One 
instrument
Direct OLS 
regression
Direct OLS 
regression
IV, One 
instrument
Direct OLS 
regression
IV, One 
instrument
Direct OLS 
regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ln(Immigrant 0.41* 0.15
 employment) (0.22) (0.43)
ln(Offshore −0.12 −0.23
 employment) (0.12) (0.21)
Industry fixed
 effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First stage: 
ln(Offshore 
employment)
ln(Immigrant 
employment)
ln(Offshore 
employment)
ln(Immigrant 
employment)
Imputed sector- 14.07** 5.83 14.07**  2.07
 specific share
 of immigrants
(4.76) (3.69) (4.76) (9.15)
Sector-specific −0.032** 0.004 −0.032** 0.007
 tariffs (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010)
Observations 464 464 464 464 464 464 464 464
Wald F-stat of 
 first stage
17.2 8.7 NA NA 17.2 NA 8.70 NA
Notes: The dependent variable in each regression is specified at the top of the relative columns. The units of obser-
vations are industry by year. All regressions include industry and year effects. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors are reported in parenthesis. In the OLS regressions the standard errors are also clustered by industry. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
1949OTTAVIANO ET AL.: IMMIGRATION, OFFSHORING, AND AMERICAN JOBSVOL. 103 NO. 5
where  N Dst ,  N Mst , and  N Ost are the logarithm of the employment levels of native, 
immigrant and offshore workers, respectively. Similar to Table 2, columns 1 and 2 
show the 2SLS estimates using the cost-driven offshoring and immigration instru-
ments (Tariffs ) st and (Im puted_ s M ) st . In columns 3 and 4 we show the direct regres-
sions. Similarly, columns 5 and 6 report the effect of offshoring costs on immigrant 
employment and columns 7 and 8 show the effect of ease of immigration on offshore 
employment. In Table 4 we then present the estimates for the aggregate employment 
regression:
(14)  N Lst =  ϕ s L +  ϕ t L +  B LO ( s Ost ) +  B LM ( s Mst ) +  ε st L ,
where  N Lst is the logarithm of aggregate employment in industry s and year t. Again 
we report the 2SLS estimates (columns 1 and 2) and then the direct regression 
results (columns 3 and 4). In all specifications the  ϕ s s are industry fixed effects, 
the  ϕ t s are time effects, and  ε st s are (possibly) serially correlated errors. The effects 
estimated in Table 3 combine the productivity effects with the displacement effects. 
Regression (14), instead, captures the pure productivity effects of offshoring and 
immigration at the industry level. A positive estimate of  B LO and  B LM would imply 
a positive overall productivity effect of a drop in offshoring and immigration costs. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported and in the direct regression 
estimates we also cluster them by industry.
Table 4—Effects of Offshoring and Immigration on Total Employment: The Productivity Effect
ln(total employment)
Method of estimation: 2SLS Method of estimation: OLS
Specifications
IV, 
one instrument
IV, 
one instrument
Direct OLS 
regression
Direct OLS 
regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Immigrant share of 3.87**
 employment (1.87)
Offshore share of 1.71**
 employment (0.57)
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 464 464 464 464
First stage: 
Offshore share of 
employment
Immigrant share 
of employment
Imputed sector-specific 1.94** 7.53**
 share of immigrants (0.55) (2.85)
Sector-specific tariffs  −0.06** −0.08
(0.01) (0.05)
F-test 16.6 12.5 NA NA
Notes: The dependent variable in each regression is the logarithm of total (native+immigrant+offshore) employ-
ment in the sector. The units of observations are industry by year. All regressions include industry and year effects. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. In the OLS regressions the standard errors are 
also clustered by industry. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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The results presented in Table 3 are in line with the predictions of the model. 
Firstly, it is important to note that the first-stage Wald F-Statistics are always above 
or close to the Stock and Yogo test critical value for weak instruments, equal to 8.96 
(15 percent maximum IV size). They are slightly different from those in Table 2 
because the explanatory variables are now employment levels (rather than employ-
ment shares) but their strength is similar. The employment estimates seem to reveal 
a positive and significant productivity effect of immigration, and an implied positive 
productivity effect of offshoring, on native-born workers. A decline of the costs of 
immigration associated with a 1 percent increase in immigrants produces a signifi-
cant increase in the employment of natives equal to 0.42 percent (Table 3, column 2) 
and has no significant effect on the total employment of offshore workers (Table 3, 
column 7). The productivity effect of offshoring is revealed by the fact that, whereas 
offshoring unambiguously reduced the share of natives and immigrants in an indus-
try (Table 2, columns 1 and 5), it has no significant effect on the aggregate employ-
ment of natives or immigrants (Table 3, columns 1 and 5). Thus, while offshore 
workers compete with natives and immigrants, their employment seems to generate 
productivity gains that increase the size of the pie, leading to an overall neutral 
impact on native and immigrant employment.
Table 4 shows the results from specification (14) which are informative on the 
size and significance of the productivity effects. The coefficients represent the 
impact of decreasing costs of offshoring and immigration on the overall size of 
the “employment pie” to be distributed across workers. As evidenced by the 2SLS 
results, both offshoring and immigration have positive productivity effects on an 
industry. The effect is quantitatively larger in the case of immigration.32 Columns 1 
and 2 in Table 4 show that an increase in the immigrant share equal to 1 percent 
increases aggregate employment by 3.9 percent, implying a significant expansion, 
again driven by the productivity effect. This is a substantial effect, particularly if 
we keep in mind that manufacturing employment actually declined over this period. 
At the same time an increase in the share of offshore employment by 1 percent is 
associated with an increase in aggregate employment of 1.7 percent. Columns 3 
and 4 of Table 4 show the direct OLS regression of aggregate employment on the 
imputed share of immigrants and on sector-specific tariffs. The regression confirms 
that an increase in cost-driven availability of immigrants increases the employment 
of the sector. A decrease in offshoring costs, on the other hand, has a positive, but 
not significant, effect on employment. The presence of productivity effects due to 
immigration and offshoring implies that, even taken together, these two forms of 
globalization of labor have not harmed native employment in the industries most 
exposed to them. To the contrary, the cost savings obtained from the tasks performed 
by immigrants and offshore workers have promoted an expansion of these industries 
relative to others and have ultimately led to increased demand for native workers 
relative to a scenario in which all tasks were performed by natives.
32 The results on offshoring are broadly consistent with Amiti and Wei (2005), who also find evidence of produc-
tivity effects by estimating conditional and unconditional labor demand functions.
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D. Effects on Tasks
Finally, we test the model’s predictions regarding the effects of offshoring and 
immigration costs on the complexity of the tasks performed by the three groups 
of workers. To see whether these predictions find support in the data, we focus on 
the average rather than the marginal task. Since in the data there is significant idio-
syncratic heterogeneity across workers, there is, of course, a region of task overlap 
between workers of different types (native/offshore and immigrants). It is therefore 
impossible to define a marginal task in the clear and deterministic way suggested 
by the model. However, the predictions on average tasks also hold in a probabi-
listic environment where individual heterogeneity produces a less sharp and more 
continuous transition between the tasks performed by native, offshore, and immi-
grant workers. Therefore, we test the model’s predictions in terms of average tasks. 
Formally, we compute the average task for each group by weighting the individual 
indices of complexity described in Section II by hours worked.
Given that complexity measures are only available for natives and immigrants, we 
implement (B5) empirically for these two groups by estimating the following two 
regressions:
(15)  I Dst =  ϕ s D +  d DO ( s Ost ) +  d DI ( s Mst ) +  ε st D
(16)  I Mst =  ϕ s M +  d MO ( s Ost ) +  d MI ( s Mst ) +  ε st M ,
where the variables  I Dst and  I Mst in (15) and (16) are the average skill intensities of 
tasks assigned to natives and immigrants, respectively;  s Ost and  s Mst are the employ-
ment shares of offshore and immigrant workers in industry s at time t ; and the  ϕ s s rep-
resent industry fixed effects. Finally the  ε st s are (possibly) serially correlated errors.
Table 5 shows the results from the 2SLS specifications (upper part of the Table) 
where we use, as always, the instruments (Tariffs ) st and (Im puted_ s M ) st and from 
the direct OLS regressions (lower part of the table). We present the effects on the 
summary indices of Complexity,  I D and  I M (in columns 1 and 5, respectively), as 
well as the effect on Cognitive Intensity (column 2), Communication Intensity (col-
umn 3), and Non-Manual Intensity (the inverse of the Manual index, in column 4) 
separately. We focus on the 2SLS results, reported in the first and second row. The 
direct regression confirms those estimates. In this case the coefficients on offshor-
ing and immigration are estimated in the same regression (since now we do not face 
the issue of collinearity of shares). The first stage F-Statistics are well above the 
critical value for the Stock and Yogo test (15 percent maximal IV size) which in the 
case of two endogenous variables and two instruments is 4.58. The first column of 
the upper part of Table 5 shows a positive and significant effect of offshoring and 
no effect of immigration on the Complexity of native tasks. The same holds true 
for their Communication Intensity, Cognitive Intensity, and Non-Manual Intensity. 
Again this is consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model. 33 Columns 5 
33 The lower part of Table 5 shows the corresponding direct regression coefficients. We see a significant effect 
of decreasing tariffs on native task complexity and no significant effect of migration. The magnitudes of the coef-
ficients cannot be interpreted as the instruments have somewhat arbitrary scale.
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and 6 indicate that offshoring has little effect on the complexity of immigrant tasks 
but, at the same time, has a large positive impact on the gap between immigrant 
and native tasks ( I D −  I M ). This suggests that offshore workers affect native work-
ers mainly by pushing them into more complex tasks, effectively hollowing out the 
task spectrum. This is consistent with the results found on employment shares (of 
natives and immigrants) in Table 2. These results are also consistent with Hummels 
et al. (2010) who find a positive effect of offshoring on the productivity of highly 
educated workers and with Harrison and McMillan (2011) who find that “verti-
cal” offshoring has positive employment effects, mainly for the highly skilled. In 
summary we can say that offshoring leads to increased polarization in native and 
 immigrant  specialization, mainly by pushing natives toward more complex jobs. 
This effect is not negligible. Since the standard deviation across sectors in the share 
of offshore workers during the period is around 14 percent, when multiplied by the 
coefficient on the complexity index estimated in column 1 we find a difference in 
task complexity relative to natives of 9 percent. This is about half of the standard 
deviation of complexity across sectors, and also half of the average difference in 
complexity of tasks performed by immigrants and natives.
E. Extensions and Checks
Before concluding we briefly discuss the implications of three key assumptions of 
our theoretical framework. A more detailed discussion of these issues and details on 
the empirical results can be found in the online Appendix of the paper.
Table 5—Effects of Offshoring and Immigration on the Skill Intensity of Native and Immigrant Tasks
Specification
Complexity 
index, 
natives
Cognitive 
index, 
natives
Communication 
index, 
natives
Non-manual 
index, 
natives
Complexity 
index, 
foreign-born
Difference in 
complexity 
natives-foreign 
born
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. 2SLS estimates
Immigrant share 0.04 0.04 0.12 0.01
 of employment (0.66) (0.43) (0.510) (0.22)
Offshore share of 0.64* 0.38** 0.41* 0.26* −0.10 0.75**
 employment (0.33) (0.19) (0.22) (0.15) (0.52) (0.31)
First stage
F-statistics 5.10 5.10 5.10 5.10 8.45 8.45
Panel B. Direct OLS estimate
Imputed sector- −0.73 −0.41 −0.37 −0.31
 specific share 
 of immigrants
(0.72) (0.45) (0.55) (0.32)
Sector-specific −0.028** −0.017** −0.019** −0.011** 0.04 0.033
 tariffs (0.012) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.20) (0.020)
Observations 464 464 464 464 464 464
Notes: Panel A shows the coefficients from the 2SLS estimation using imputed sector-specific share of immigrants 
and sector-specific tariffs as instrument. Panel B shows the results of a direct regression of the dependent variables 
on the instruments. The units of observations are industry by year. All regressions include industry fixed effects. 
Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the sector level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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First, ours is a model of “vertical” offshoring. Namely, offshoring takes place in 
order to reduce costs and the intermediate tasks performed by offshore workers are 
combined to produce a good sold at home. Hence our implications on the impact of 
offshoring on native tasks should work better in industries that are engaged primar-
ily in vertical offshoring. This is confirmed when we split the sample between indus-
tries that re-import a large share of their offshore production (vertical-offshoring) 
versus those that sell a larger share abroad (horizontal-offshoring). When running 
a specification as in (1) in Table 5, and focusing only on sectors doing vertical-
offshoring, the impact of offshore employment on native complexity is large and 
significant (1.10 with standard error of 0.59). In contrast, the same regression run 
using the sample of sectors doing horizontal offshoring produces non-significant 
estimates (0.17 with standard error of 0.23).34
Second, whereas we assumed perfect mobility of workers, in the presence of 
imperfect mobility or barriers to transferring skills from one industry to another 
a portion of the industry-specific effects of immigration and offshoring could be 
captured by wage rather than employment differentials. In particular, while the US 
labor force is mobile geographically, as well as across industries, in the short run 
wages may not be perfectly equalized. We check directly whether industry wages 
are affected by offshoring and immigration by running a specification like (11), 
except using the average wage of natives instead of their employment as the depen-
dent variable. The estimates (reported and described in online Appendix, Table A3) 
do not show any significant effect of offshoring and immigration on wages.
Finally, as discussed in Section IVA, imputed immigration, an instrument routinely 
used in the immigration literature, is usually constructed using variation across locali-
ties rather than industries. As a further check that industry-specific network effects are 
also driven, in part, by the geographic concentration of an industry, we re-run regres-
sion (11) focusing on industries that are particularly concentrated in space. Since our 
2SLS approach relies on a strong relationship between the flow of immigrants from a 
particular country into an industry and the share of US immigrants from the same coun-
try already working in that industry, the first-stage regression should show increased 
power when we consider only highly geographically concentrated  industries. Again, 
this is because new immigrants tend to favor destinations where there are ethnic net-
works created by previous immigrants (Card 2001; Card and DiNardo 2000; Peri and 
Sparber 2009). A recent paper by Patel and Vella (2007) also shows a concentration of 
immigrants by location and type of occupation.
In order to capture the degree to which an industry is concentrated within the 
United States, we calculate a geographic Gini coefficient for each industry using 
data on state and industry employment in 2000.35 Interestingly, the manufacturing 
sector as a whole is significantly more concentrated than non-manufacturing, with 
an average Gini of 0.75 compared to 0.72, which bodes well for the validity of 
the instrument overall. In other words, an immigrant’s decision regarding which 
industry to work in may overlap with their choice of location, strengthening the 
network effects underlying our IV approach. We therefore take the manufactur-
ing average as our threshold and reproduce the first-stage regression using only 
34 The details of the empirical analysis and the exact definition of the variables are in the online Appendix.
35 These employment data are available for download from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics website.
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those industries with a Gini larger than 0.75, a value that is near the median and so 
selects nearly 50 percent of the sample.
The corresponding findings are depicted in Table 6. Comparing the 2SLS 
results in columns 1 and 2 with the results for the entire sample (in columns 1 
and 2 of Table 3), we see that restricting the sample to more concentrated indus-
tries increases the  estimated, average impact of immigrants on native employment 
(from 0.42 to 0.50). This, combined with the relatively larger first-stage coef-
ficient shown in column 2 (to be compared with column 2 in Table 3) constitutes 
evidence that our immigration instrument is somewhat stronger for spatially con-
centrated industries and, for these industries, the productivity effect of immigra-
tion is also somewhat stronger.
V. Concluding Remarks
We have analyzed the effects of easier offshoring and immigration on the 
employment share, employment level, and task specialization of native work-
ers within the US manufacturing sector from 2000 to 2007. There are very few 
attempts to combine analyses of immigration and offshoring on labor markets. 
Analyzing each in isolation ignores the possibility that hiring immigrants or off-
shoring productive tasks are alternatives that are simultaneously available to pro-
ducers and, in fact, may compete with one another or with hiring a native worker.
Table 6—Employment Regressions for Geographically Concentrated Industries
ln(native employment)
Method of estimation: 2SLS Method of estimation: OLS
Specifications
IV, 
one instrument
IV, 
one instrument
Direct OLS 
regression
Direct OLS 
regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Immigrant 0.49**
 employment) (0.22)
ln(Offshore −0.12
 employment) (0.08)
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
First stage: 
ln(Offshore 
employment)
ln(Immigrant 
employment)
Imputed sector-specific 20.96** 10.37*
 share of immigrants (8.43) (5.46)
Sector-specific tariffs −0.06** 0.08
(0.01) (0.05)
Observations 200 200 200 200
F-test of first stage 33.2 6.80 NA NA
Notes: The dependent variable in each regression is the logarithm of native employment. We only include the manu-
facturing sectors with Gini coefficient of geographic concentration across states larger than 0.75, which is the aver-
age for the Gini in manufacturing. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported. In specification (3) and 
(4) standard errors are also clustered at the industry level. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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We have modeled and found empirical support for a scenario in which jobs (“tasks”) 
vary in terms of their relative intensity of use of workers’ complex skills, while native, 
immigrant and offshore workers differ systematically in their relative endowments 
of these skills. When only natives are available, producers will only employ them. 
When immigrant and offshore workers become increasingly employable, efficiency 
gains can be reaped by hiring them to perform tasks in which they have a comparative 
advantage, giving native workers the opportunity to specialize in the tasks in which 
they exhibit their own comparative advantage. If strong enough, the productivity effect 
associated with this improved task assignment may offset the displacement effect of 
immigration and offshoring on native workers’ employment.
Despite the widely held belief that immigration and offshoring are reducing the 
job opportunities of US natives, we have found instead that, during our period of 
observation, manufacturing industries with a larger increase in global exposure 
(through offshoring and immigration) fared better than those with lagging exposure 
in terms of native employment growth.
Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 1
Sufficient conditions for the existence of  I NO ∈ (0, 1) and  I MO ∈ (0,  I NO ) such that
min [ c D (i),  c M (i),  c O (i)] =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
 c M (i), 0 ≤ i <  I MO 
 c O (i),  I MO < i <  I NO 
 c D (i),  I NO < i ≤ 1
are that, as i increases from 0 to 1,  c O (i) crosses  c D (i) once and only once and 
from below in the interval i ∈ (0, 1) and  c M (i) crosses  c O (i) once and only once and 
from below in the interval i ∈ (0,   I NO ). The first single-crossing condition holds if 
 c O (0) <  c D (0),  c O (1) >  c D (1), and d c O (i)/di > d c D (i)/di = 0. The “marginal 
offshore task” is then implicitly defined by  c O ( I NO ) =  c D ( I NO ). Substituting for 
 c O (i) =  w ∗ βt(i) a L and  c D (i) = w a L gives (3) and w =  w ∗ βt( I NO ). The second 
 single-crossing condition holds if  c M (0) <  c O (0),  c M ( I NO ) >  c O ( I NO ) and d c M (i)/di > 
d c O (i)/di. The “marginal immigrant task” is then implicitly defined by  c M ( I MO ) =  c O ( I MO ). Substituting for  c M (i) =  w ∗ δτ (i) a L and  c O (i) =  w ∗ βt(i) a L gives (4) and βt( I MO ) = δτ ( I MO ).
Appendix B.  
Employment Levels, Employment Shares, and Average Tasks
Given the allocation of tasks in Proposition 1, marginal cost pricing under perfect 
competition implies that tasks are priced as follows
p ( i ) = 
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
 c M (i) =  w ∗ δτ (i) a L   0 ≤ i <  I MO 
 c O (i) =  w ∗ βt(i) a L   I MO ≤ i <  I NO .
   c D = w a L   I NO < i ≤ 1
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Then, by (1) and (2), the demand for task i is
 L(i) =  [ p ( i )  _ P L   ] −σ ( P L ) −  1 _ 1−α   ( α  p Y A )  1 _ 1−α   H,
where  P L is the exact price index of the labor composite, defined as
  P L =  a L  { ∫ 0  I MO   [ δτ (i) w ∗ ] 1−σ di +  ∫  I MO   I NO   [ βt(i) w ∗ ] 1−σ di + (1 −  I NO ) w 1−σ }  1 _ 1−σ  .
Since i ∈ [0, 1],  P L is also the average price (and average marginal cost) of tasks. 
Given Proposition 1, we can rewrite this as  P L = w a L Ω( I MO ,  I NO ) with
(B1) Ω( I MO ,  I NO ) =  { ∫ 0  I MO  [  δτ (i) _ βt( I NO ) ] 1−σ di +  ∫  I MO   I NO  [  t(i) _ t( I NO ) ] 1−σ di + (1 −  I NO ) }  1 _ 1−σ  .
This highlights the relationship between  P L and the bundling parameter Ω in 
Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), which we encompass as a limit case when 
σ goes to zero and δ goes to infinity—that is, when tasks are not substitutable and 
migration is prohibitively difficult. Expression (B1) shows that changes in the 
migration friction δ and the offshoring friction β that decrease Ω( I MO ,  I NO ) imply 
improved efficiency in labor usage. This is the source of the productivity effects of 
immigration and offshoring discussed in Section IIIB.
Taking into account the different marginal productivity of the three groups of 
workers, the amount of labor demanded to perform task i is
N ( i ) = 
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
 a L δτ (i)L(i)    0 ≤ i <  I MO 
 a L βt(i)L(i)  I MO ≤ i <  I NO ,
 a L L(i)  I NO < i ≤ 1
so that immigrant, offshore, and native employment levels are given by
(B2)  N M =  ∫ 0  I MO  N ( i ) di =  1 _  w ∗   (  P M  _ P L   ) 1−σ ( P L ) −  α _ 1−α  B
  N O =  ∫  I MO   I NO  N ( i ) di =  1 _  w ∗  (  P O  _ P L  ) 1−σ ( P L ) −  α _ 1−α  B
  N D =  ∫  I NO  1 N ( i ) di =  1 _ w  (  P D  _ P L  ) 1−σ ( P L ) −  α _ 1−α  B,
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where B = (α  p Y A )  
1 _ 
1−α  H > 0 is a combination of parameters and exogenous vari-
ables, and the exact price indices of immigrant, offshore, and native tasks are 
given by
(B3)  P M =  a L  { ∫ 0  I MO  [ δτ(i) w ∗ ] 1−σ di }  1 _ 1−σ  ,    P O =  a L  { ∫  I MO   I NO  [ βt(i) w ∗ ] 1−σ di }  1 _ 1−σ  , 
  P D =  a L {  ( 1 −  I NO )  w 1−σ }  
1 _ 
1−σ  .
Note that  N M is the number of immigrants employed whereas, due to the frictional 
migration cost, the corresponding number of units of immigrant labor is  N M /δ. 
Hence, sector employment is  N L =  N M +  N O +  N D . The shares of the three groups 
of workers in sectoral employment are thus
(B4)  s M =    ( P M ) 
1−σ    ___     ( P M ) 1−σ +  ( P O ) 1−σ +  ( P D ) 1−σ ( w ∗ /w )  
  s O =    ( P O ) 
1−σ    ___     ( P M ) 1−σ +  ( P O ) 1−σ +  ( P D ) 1−σ ( w ∗ /w )  
  s D =    ( w 
∗ /w )  ( P D ) 1−σ    ___   ( P M ) 1−σ +  ( P O ) 1−σ +  ( P D ) 1−σ ( w ∗ /w )  .
Finally, the “average task” performed by each group is defined as the 
 employment-weighted average across the corresponding i s:
(B5)  I M =   ∫ 0 
 I MO  iN  ( i ) di
  _ N M   =  
 ∫ 0  I MO  i τ (i ) 1−σ di  __ ∫ 0  I MO  τ (i ) 1−σ di
  
  I O =   I MO +  
 ∫  I MO   I NO  iN ( i ) di _ N O   =  I MO +  
 ∫  I MO   I NO  it(i ) 1−σ di  __ ∫  I MO   I NO  t(i ) 1−σ di
  
  I D =   I NO +  
 ∫  I NO  1 iN ( i )  di  _ N D   =  
 I NO + 1 _
2
  .
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